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Kant tells us that two things awe him most: the starry 
skies above and the moral law within. But, we might ask, is 
Kant mistaken in grounding the experience of sublimity in his 
moral philosophy as an “attempt to unify art and ethics?”1 
Appreciating the natural sublime in a way that seeks to under-
stand the experience in an all-encompassing manner seems 
quite sensible in some approaches to environmental aesthetics. 
Understandably, then, scholars such as Allen Carlson and Noël 
Carroll seem to defend versions of aesthetic objectivism such 
that these connections are maintained. However, experiences in 
the natural world that are termed “sublime,” can be better 
understood through a specific kind of religious-aesthetic 
appreciation. In what follows, I argue that the natural sublime 
(sublimity as experienced in the natural world) is an experience 
that is closer to what Merold Westphal might call “religiously 
useful,” in that it inspires the sort of awe and celebration that 
connects us to the divine. Building on a view of the sublime 
which mirrors Emmanuel Levinas’s view of the ethical encoun-
ter with the Other, I contend that the natural sublime frustrates 
                                                
1 Julian Young, “Death and Transfiguration: Kant, Schopenhauer and 
Heidegger on the Sublime,” Inquiry: an interdisciplinary journal of 
philosophy and the social sciences Vol. 48, no. 2 (2005): 136. 
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an aesthetic objectivist approach that requires truth values for 
our judgments of what is beautiful and sublime. I will suggest 
that since such objectivist accounts do not accurately capture 
the phenomenological subjectivity experienced in the natural 
sublime, postmodern religious thought can helpfully supple-
ment the field of environmental aesthetics.  
 I will proceed as follows. First, I will describe what I 
take to be the aesthetic objectivist theories of Carlson and 
Carroll, showing why they are inadequate in describing our 
experience of the natural sublime. Next, I will show how a 
comparison of Levinas’s ethical encounter and the natural 
sublime is relevant to the discussion in environmental aesthetics 
because it grounds the content of this experience. Moreover, it 
does so in a way that is “religiously useful” in ways similar to 
Westphal’s description of the God of postmodern religious 
thought. I conclude that an aesthetic appreciation of the natural 
sublime should not reduce the subjective experience to the 
phenomenal object’s properties and our judgments of it to true 
or false propositions. That problematic approach falsely 
delineates the sublime as merely an object in nature, thus 
erasing the existential essence of such experiences. 
 The debate regarding how we ought to appreciate 
nature is a much-discussed issue in contemporary environmen-
tal aesthetics. Allen Carlson notices the issues that arise in our 
attempts either to treat nature as art objects or reduce nature to 
picturesque landscapes. When we treat nature as an art object 
we take it out of its environmental context and when we reduce 
nature to picturesque landscapes we selectively and inappropri-
ately choose from the whole of nature limited portions of it. As 
Ronald Rees points out, this latter view of reducing nature to 
the picturesque has “confirmed our anthropocentrism by 
suggesting that nature exists to please as well as to serve us. … 
It is an unfortunate lapse which allows us to abuse our local 
environments and venerate the Alps and the Rockies.”2 Finding 
                                                
2 Ronald Rees, “Mountain Scenery,” History Today 25 (1975): 312. 
Quoted in Allen Carlson, “Aesthetic Appreciation of the Natural 
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both approaches problematic, Carlson attempts to understand 
nature in terms of its appropriate context, similar to how we 
make aesthetic judgments of works of art. He writes, writes:  
 
If to appropriately aesthetically appreciate art we must 
have knowledge of art forms, classifications of works, 
and artistic traditions, then to appropriately aesthetical-
ly appreciate nature we must have knowledge of the 
different systems and elements within those environ-
ments…Thus, the natural and environmental sciences 
are central to appropriate aesthetic appreciation of na-
ture.3 
 
In the same way in which knowledge of painting in the early 
twentieth century is necessary for appreciating the works of the 
Cubists, some knowledge of flora and fauna are necessary to 
appreciate a natural environment rich in flowers and plants.  
Noël Carroll does not reject Carlson’s account, but of-
fers an alternative view in which he claims that some aesthetic 
judgments are emotional responses to nature, and that these are 
just as valid as judgments based upon an understanding of the 
natural sciences. What validates them is the appropriateness of 
the emotional response to the natural environment a person 
experiences. Carroll understands that a central question 
concerning the aesthetic appreciation of nature subsists in the 
overarching dichotomy between aesthetic relativism and 
aesthetic objectivism. The aesthetic relativist asserts that the 
aesthetic judgments about nature are absolutely subjective 
because they are entirely relative to those who make them. The 
aesthetic objectivist, alternatively, claims that judgments about 
nature are objectively true or false. In Carlson’s view aesthetic 
                                                                                         
Environment,” in Arguing About Art: Contemporary Philosophical 
Debates, ed. Alex Neill and Aaron Ridley (New York: Routledge, 
2008), 161. 
3 Ibid., 166. 
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judgments can be true if they are based on correct knowledge of 
the natural environment that one experiences. In Carroll’s 
model, aesthetic judgments are true if the emotional response 
they convey is appropriate to the natural environment one is 
responding to.4 Both Carlson’s and Carroll’s models involve 
judgments that are true or false based on matters of fact 
concerning the aesthetic properties of some natural phenomena. 
They both presuppose aesthetic objectivism when it comes to 
the appreciation of nature. Specifically, they depend upon the 
existence of universal, aesthetic properties inherent in natural 
phenomena, while disagreeing about the location of such 
properties and how to access them. 
 Both Carlson and Carroll have insightful reasons for 
contending that aesthetic objectivism is preferable to aesthetic 
relativism regarding our judgments about the natural world. If it 
were not, it would seem impossible to characterize certain 
phenomena as beautiful, striking, visually appealing, and so on. 
Everything in the natural world would appear to us as a 
“blooming buzzing confusion,”5 as William James writes. In 
order to make sense of the world we make truth claims about 
the aesthetic properties of some perceptual object. In doing this, 
we pragmatically dissolve any epistemic limits to our cognition 
in an effort to communicate what is “appropriate, correct, or 
true.”6 By comparing nature to art, Carlson thinks we achieve 
the method for making qualified judgments about nature. 
Because “the objectivity of aesthetic judgments of art depends 
upon identifying the correct category for the artwork in 
question,”7 by applying the comparable paradigm or standard to 
                                                
4 Noël Carroll, “On Being Moved by Nature: Between Religion and 
Natural History,” in Arguing About Art: Contemporary Philosophical 
Debates, ed. Alex Neill and Aaron Ridley (New York: Routledge, 
2008), 177-78. 
5 William James, The Principles of Psychology [1890] (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1981), 462. Quoted by Carlson, 164.  
6 Carroll, “On Being Moved by Nature,” 180. 
7 Ibid., 181. 
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natural phenomena we are able to make judgments which are 
either true or false about such phenomena—with the natural 
sciences serving as the standard for such judgments. Likewise, 
Carroll thinks that because we can objectively judge our 
emotional responses to what is experiences in nature as 
appropriate of not, they can give us accurate aesthetic judg-
ments of nature.  
 The aesthetic objectivist views that Carlson and Carroll 
champion are problematic because they assume that objectively 
true judgments about phenomena in the natural environment are 
what we are looking for in our appreciation of it. However, I 
would argue that there are experiences in nature that are awe-
inspiring in such a way that they problematize these types of 
objective judgments. They are grounded in an essentially 
subjective appreciation that is internal to a subject’s unique 
relation to it. These are experiences of the natural sublime 
which in some way exceed our appreciation of nature as 
something beautiful.  
The natural sublime is an experience in the natural 
world that overwhelms us. It might involve a feeling whereby 
the object of our perception throws us back on ourselves so that 
we feel our total insignificance in comparison with to nature. In 
some experiences with the natural world we ride the fine line 
between appreciating the imperial grandeur of a phenomenon 
and the displeasing anxiety that it can arouse in our relation to 
it. Sublimity in nature only makes sense when I attempt to 
make sense of myself in comparison to it. I notice the differ-
ence between what is out there in the world, and what I possess 
as someone who experiences the out-there-ness. Sandra 
Shapshay identifies this difference when she observes that, 
“what is sublime for Kant is not something in the world—some 
portion of the ‘real’ that we directly experience—but a feeling 
we have that is occasioned by certain sensory experiences.”8 In 
                                                
8 Sandra Shapshay, “Contemporary Environmental Aesthetics and the 
Neglect of the Sublime.” British Journal of Aesthetics 52, no.2 
(2013). 
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all of our attempts to describe the sublime we run into an 
epistemic limit that allows us to communicate such experiences 
only by appealing to subjective sentiments—overwhelming, 
stunning, heart-palpitating. How should we approach making 
judgments of an experience that necessarily involves a subject 
who is at stake in the experience?  
 Emmanuel Levinas’s encounter with what he calls the 
‘Other’ is a compelling place to start in thinking through the 
answer to this question. The natural sublime may occasion a 
kind of experience like the encounter with the Other, which is 
initially the interruption to my “unchecked desire,” and my 
“unbridled self-interest.”9 When I meet someone on the street 
who asks me for spare change, for example, I am suddenly 
interrupted by the Other who presents me with an ethical 
responsibility. Even if I don’t think I should give them spare 
change, I am still confronted with the ethical question: should I 
or not? This ethical responsibility is brought about by an 
asymmetrical relationship with an Other that I cannot fully 
understand. For Levinas, this encounter is pre-ontological 
because it inaugurates selfhood as a response to the infinite 
demand upon us from each and every Other. This encounter 
with the Other is not a spacio-temporal phenomenon because it 
occurs in the realm of the ethical rather than in the domain of 
being. For this reason Levinas answers in the negative to the 
question “is ontology fundamental?” Instead, on his model, the 
ethical encounter itself cannot be totalized in either concept or 
being. This totality for Levinas, as Michael Morgan describes 
it, is “the domain circumscribed, encompassed, and to a degree 
constructed by the self of the agent, … the domain of reason or 
mind or culture or theory.”10 The infinity of such an encounter 
speaks to the inability of my understanding to completely grasp 
the Other, and my inability ever to fully eradicate my responsi-
bility to the Other. In this ethical encounter, I concede my 
                                                
9 Michael L. Morgan. The Cambridge Introduction to Emmanuel 
Levinas, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 69. 
10 Ibid., 44.  
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ability totally to grasp the world—my very identity becomes a 
response to the enigma that calls me into question and to 
selfhood. My subjectivity, therefore, is a response to a ques-
tion—one that is entirely foreign to me. In this sense, Levinas 
asserts that subjectivity is not rooted in autonomy; it is ontolog-
ically conditioned by something exterior to it—a preceding 
alterity. I gain myself because of the Other—as such, I am 
never fully transparent to myself.  
  It follows that the experiences whereby my very 
selfhood is at stake are of a different sort than the experiences 
that I understand through reason alone. Being able to grasp the 
beauty of a landscape in terms of an objective metric concerns 
the aesthetic properties of the landscape (Carlson and Carroll). 
However, an experience in nature that inaugurates my being at 
stake in it is of another kind—it is the stuff of sublimity.  
 I imagine I am perceiving a landscape through a 
detailed knowledge of the natural environment, or from behind 
a camera lens at an overlook. Emotionally or cognitively, I 
respond to the objects of perception as they appear—
aesthetically beautiful or complex. In doing so, I am totalizing 
these objects according to my conceptual judgment of them, as 
Levinas would say. I circumscribe, encompass, and construct 
the view. I view it in a way in which I can rationally compre-
hend it. I intend an aesthetic object whereby judgments of 
beauty, grandeur, etc. are of an objective quality because the 
judgments are made about the object alone. What changes, 
though, when I am 2000 ft. above ground on the side of a rock-
face, where I hang from a solitary anchor while rock-climbing? 
The aesthetic appreciation we are likely to feel here (should we 
dare to be there) is an altogether a different appreciation—one 
that may make me aware of my finitude, shudder at the incalcu-
lable perspective, or attempt to tell myself that anxiety is 
useless and I am not in danger. Any judgment I make will 
necessarily be relevant to or informed by my own subjectivi-
ty—my own inability to remove the feeling from my experienc-
ing of the sublime object. My experience with the natural 
sublime is one I cannot appreciate on a basis that removes my 
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subjectivity from the judgments—making them objectively the 
case.  
 François Marty says that “totality is a matter for reason 
and its satisfaction. Seeking the point at which differences rest 
upon a ‘same,’ where the quest for unity is appeased, whereas 
infinity is a matter for imagination.”11 Similarly, Matthew 
Sanderson explains how in Kant’s view reason fits into his view 
of the dynamical sublime. For Kant, the dynamical sublime 
“consists in the mental relationship between sensibility and 
reason that is excited by experiences of extremely powerful 
natural objects...”12 In experiencing the dynamical sublime, first 
we are fearful of being overwhelmed by the natural event so 
that we become aware of our finitude. The event is something 
that very well could crush us with absolute indifference. 
However, the pleasure that we feel at the very next instant 
supersedes the fear because our intellect has the ability to 
reason. According to Julian Young, then, we stand in a sort of 
imaginative distance with the object of sublimity in nature and, 
thereby, feel this “expansion of the self, a flowing out of the 
ego and into totality of things,” which Freud calls an “‘oceanic 
feeling.”13 
 Because the sublime involves a subjective feeling 
which synthesizes pleasure and displeasure towards a phenom-
enon, it does not warrant that a common aesthetic appreciation 
for both the naturally beautiful and naturally sublime. Young 
argues that “for a proper interpretation of the sublime, we need 
a different metaphysics,”14 but must we embrace a blooming 
buzzing confusion as a result? I think not. Jane Forsey de-
                                                
 
11 François Marty, “Height and the Sublime,” trans. by Jeffrey 
Bloechl, Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 20 no. 2, (1998), 357. 
12 Matthew Sanderson, “Kant and Schopenhauer on Death and the 
Religious Sublime.” Contemporary Philosophy 28 no.3, (2008), 35. 
13 Julian Young, “Death and Transfiguration: Kant, Schopenhauer and 
Heidegger on the Sublime,” 140. 
14 Ibid., 141. 
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scribes the epistemic issue with treating the sublime like an 
object whose value is in its aesthetic properties when she says,  
 
The heart of the problem, then, is this: if we focus on 
the metaphysical status of the sublime object, our epis-
temology becomes problematic, but if we address in-
stead the epistemological transcendence of a certain 
experience, we still seem forced to make some meta-
physical claim about the object of that experience.15  
 
In order even to cognize the natural sublime we must first have 
some idea about how to describe the phenomenon. Here we are 
not totally without words. There is in fact a horizon of meaning 
involved here just as there is in recognizing the Other in her 
alterity. If there were not any horizon by which we could 
account for such alterity, then the phenomena which “inter-
rupt[s] our joyous possession of the world” would not interrupt 
because it could not be apprehended at all. Crucially, Levinas 
says that the Other “overflows” comprehension, not that the 
other is incomprehensible. In the same way, we can say that the 
natural sublime overflows our comprehension, not that it is 
incomprehensible. What is required, then, is an appreciation 
based on the tension between totality, because we do make 
judgments about the natural sublime, and infinity, because these 
judgments are always epistemically limited by subjectivity’s 
inability to grasp transcendence in absolution.  
 What would it look like to engage with the excess of 
the natural sublime without totalizing the phenomenon? In 
Overcoming Onto-Theology, Merold Westphal considers a 
similar question but in relation to religious existence. For 
Westphal, this problem of expressing excess, while not elimi-
nating the excess in the expression, occurs in the case of the 
metaphysical God which we have fully subsumed under our 
                                                
15 Jane Forsey, “Is a Theory of the Sublime Possible?” JAC 65 no.4, 
(2007), 383.   
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own philosophical categories: “When we assume the adequacy 
of our concepts to the divine reality, we make ourselves the 
measure and master of that reality and convert it into the 
invisible mirror of our intellectual capacities.”16 Westphal 
warns, “when theology buys into this philosophical project, it 
renders the God of whom it speaks religiously useless.”17 In 
Martin Heidegger’s words, this is the God of philosophy and 
“man can neither fall to his knees in awe nor can he play music 
and dance before this god.”18 This reductionist tendency about 
which Westphal and Heidegger are both worried, is strikingly 
similar, I think, to an aesthetic objectivist appreciation of the 
natural sublime.  
 Westphal suggests that Levinas answers the question as 
to what God could come after postmodernism, saying, “We 
must think of God as the voice that exceeds vision so as to 
establish a relation irreducible to comprehension.” God 
construed this way is quite appropriately another name for the 
Other. Might we be more accurate in our judgments if we 
apprehend the sublime object in nature similarly? Though 
totalization is necessary, it is the burden of infinity imposed 
through subjectivity that gives it real value. In the same fashion, 
to totalize the experience of the sublime is to reduce the object 
of our gaze to its aesthetic properties—to value such experienc-
es through a reductionism—characteristic of aesthetic objectiv-
ism. What if the natural sublime were rethought, then, in such a 
way as to allow for a suspension of objectivist epistemologies 
in order to more appropriately gauge the object of the natural 
sublime? What would this object be if not a phenomenon 
available in full presence to my totalizing schemes? Appropriat-
ing Westphal, I think the answer is that the natural sublime 
                                                
16 Merold Westphal, Overcoming Onto-theology: toward a postmod-
ern Christian faith, (New York: Fordham University Press, 2001): 
269, my emphasis. 
17 Ibid., 261. 
18 Martin Heidegger, Identity and Difference, trans. Joan Stambaugh 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1969), 72. Quoted by Westphal, 261. 
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becomes better understood as an invitation to existential 
reflection. 
 I do not mean to suggest that the natural sublime is the 
God of postmodernism, nor do I wish to equate the sublime 
experience or feeling to the Other or the infinity from which the 
Other calls forth. Rather, the paradigm is relevant because there 
are numerous examples in relation to which Kant, Schopenhau-
er, Burke, and others have struggled to communicate the 
essence of sublime experiences. How does one conceptualize 
transcendence, as such? The natural sublime is uniquely 
suitable to a phenomenologically religious discourse by means 
of a Levinasian frame because it highlights the existential 
traction of such an experience. It calls into question and at the 
same time reaffirms the existence of the self in relation to what 
is Other.  
 If, “the sublime is the experience of the excess of 
infinity over totality,”19 then the natural sublime takes on a new 
role—one that allows for an appreciation that judges such 
experiences not on their aesthetic properties, but their existen-
tial relevance. The natural sublime is not valuable because it is 
the activity of making life into an object of appreciation. 
Rather, it is invaluable as the activity of appreciating life as a 
subject living it. While the Other interrupts our “joyous 
possession of the world,” the sublime interrupts our joyous 
totalization of nature in the aesthetic objectivist attitude. The 
natural sublime understood as such may not lead us to God or 
replace our encounter with the Other, but it can provide us with 
an experience that inspires the awe and celebration that has 
traditionally been the province of the divine. The postmodern 
approach can help us better to understand and appreciate this 
existential dimension of the natural sublime—whether we are 
hanging off of the cliff or taking a picture of it from a distance. 
 
 
                                                
19 Marty, “Height and the Sublime,” 362. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Furman Humanities Review 
 
 
 
72 
Works Cited 
 
Carlson, Allen. “Aesthetic Appreciation of the Natural Envi-
ronment.” In Arguing About Art: Contemporary Philo-
sophical Debates, edited by Alex Neill and Aaron Rid-
ley, 157-171. Abingdon: Routledge, 2008. 
 
Carroll, Noël. “On Being Moved by Nature: Between Religion 
and Natural History.” In Arguing About Art: Contem-
porary Philosophical Debates edited by Alex Neill and 
Aaron Ridley, 172-191. Abingdon: Routledge, 2008. 
 
Lévinas, Emmanuel. “Philosophy and the Idea of Infinity,” in 
Collected Philosophical Papers. Translated by Al-
phonso Lingis. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 
(1957), 1998. 
 
Marty, François. “Height and the Sublime.” Graduate Faculty 
Philosophy Journal 20 no. 2: 355-366. 
 
Morgan, Michael L. The Cambridge Introduction to Emmanuel 
Levinas. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2011. 
 
Forsey, Jane. “Is a Theory of the Sublime Possible?” The 
Journal of Aesthetic Criticism 65, no. 4: 381-389. 
 
Sanderson, Matthew. “Kant and Schopenhauer on Death and 
the Religious Sublime.” Contemporary Philosophy 28, 
no.3: 34-39. 
 
Shapshay, Sandra. “Contemporary Environmental Aesthetics 
and the Neglect of the Sublime.” British Journal of 
Aesthetics 53, no. 2: 181-198.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Maia Wellborn 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
73 
Westphal, Merold. “Hermeneutics as Epistemology,” in 
Overcoming Onto-theology: toward a postmodern 
Christian faith, Fordham University Press, 2001. 
 
Young, Julian. “Death and Trandfiguration: Kant, Schopenhau-
er and Heidegger on the Sublime,” Inquiry: an 
 interdisciplinary journal of philosophy and the  
social sciences 48, no. 2: 131-144.
